How Good Is Jameis Winston?

It's common for fans to get exhausted by the media's over-coverage of a player and begin to take it out on that player. It becomes popular to deem the player "overrated." It's happened with Tebow, Manziel and Bridgewater in recent years. After watching him in every single snap this season, I can say that it shouldn't happen with Jameis Winston.

Note that the images and gifs below are intended to demonstrate the qualities or tendencies I'm discussing, not to prove that Winston possesses those things. In other words, I can't post every single example of Winston being accurate and inaccurate to prove his accuracy, but I tried to share some of the most impressive examples. 

Strengths

Size. Winston has prototypical size: 6'4" and 228 pounds.

Arm strength. By now you should have seen the videos of him throwing baserunners out from rightfield, clocking 96 mph fastballs and tossing footballs over the Pike House. I'd rate his arm strength a 9/10 — it's not the strongest I've seen, but there is not a single throw he can't make.

Watch the cornerback on this play: He breaks on the throw immediately but has no chance. Throwing behind the squat cornerback in Cover 2/Tampa 2 is among the more difficult things to do as a quarterback, but Winston makes it look easy. It doesn't matter if you’re playing on Saturday or Sunday (or Thursday or Monday) — the corner isn't going to break up a pass that has this much velocity.

There are enough examples of Winston's arm strength in the rest of my analysis that I won't waste any more space discussing it — except to share this gif.

Throwing this ball is a terrible decision, but effortlessly throwing a ball 35 yards while falling down is impressive.

Accuracy and ball placement. When you complete 67.9% of your passes in an offense that doesn't feature many screens and quick throws (ahem, air raid QBs), you're an accurate passer. But to be elite, throwing a catchable pass isn't enough; you also have to be able to recognize where the ball needs to be based on the defender's leverage and get it there. That's ball placement.

Here's a simple example of good ball placement. Targeting the seam route, Winston throws behind the receiver to avoid the linebacker in the middle. Winston's awareness of ball placement is clear in nearly every throw he makes. Here are a few more examples of his incredible accuracy.

Winston avoids the pass rush, keeps his eyes downfield and puts this ball where only his guy can catch it in double coverage.

Here's a great demonstration of arm strength and accuracy. This ball was thrown from the 25-yard line while Winston was rolling to his left. The receiver doesn't even break stride.

This is an NFL throw. The defense runs a fire zone blitz (three deep and three underneath coverage). Winston sees the safety, the deep middle 1/3 defender, vacate his zone to chase the slot and hits the outside receiver on the post. This ball is perfectly placed. Notice also how quickly Winston makes the decision to throw when the safety turns his hips — that awareness fits into the football IQ category.

Football IQ. This is more difficult to demonstrate, but it becomes clear watching a quarterback before the snap and seeing how often he looks confused immediately after the snap. I could count on one hand how many times I saw Winston look surprised by a defense after the snap.

I went ahead and labeled this coverage, but it's not easy to diagnose pre-snap. It could be Cover 6 (also known as Quarter-Quarter-Half, it's Cover 2 to the boundary, Quarters to the field); Cover 0 corner blitz (man with no deep safety), with the boundary safety creeping over to cover the single-side receiver so that the boundary corner can blitz; or even Cover 3 (three deep, four under), with the boundary corner bailing to the deep 1/3 at the snap.

Winston recognizes Man Free (man coverage with one deep safety), watches the safety and throws away from him. The short route by the outside receiver keeps the cornerback low, clearing space for the slot receiver to work behind him.

Winston doesn't do much after that except deliver a perfect ball.

I will say that there's room for Winston to improve his deep accuracy — though it's still outstanding — and he occasionally overthrows intermediate routes, which can lead to interceptions when you're throwing over the middle.

Pocket presence. Winston is excellent against outside pressure and good against inside pressure. He has no qualms about taking a hit to deliver a pass, is very comfortable stepping into a pass rush and knows when to scramble.

Despite his size, he frequently eludes the rush; when he can't, he's strong enough to fight through tackles. And the best part is that he keeps his eyes downfield.

Mobility. Winston is a capable runner but not a deadly one. He's not particularly fast (his 40 time is listed as low as sub-4.6, but he looks like a 4.65 to me); he'd rather throw than run; and he isn't going to break off a long run like Marcus Mariota (his longest run this season is 20 yards).

Weaknesses

My list of weaknesses for Winston demonstrate just how difficult it is to find flaws in his game.

I wouldn't consider it a huge weakness, but as far as mechanics his delivery isn't as compact as it could be — he tends to drop the ball when he starts his motion.

There are also a few instances where his footwork broke down. For example, sometimes he adds an unnecessary bounce at the end of his drop. Neither of these things should concern pro scouts.

Ball handling and security. Winston's play fakes aren't good, but that's not a big deal. More concerning is that he's lax with the ball when he starts scrambling.

Even when he tucks the ball to run, he tends to hold it loosely. He usually gets away with it in college because he's so strong, but it's something he needs to clean up.

Doesn't check down or throw the ball away. This is the real weakness in Winston's game right now. There are half a dozen examples in every game.

A toss to the running back at the top would have been an easy first down, and even throwing to the shallow crossing route would have yielded better results. Instead, Winston invariably tries to extend the play when he feels pressure.

On these bootlegs, you're supposed to throw the flat route if you feel pressure early. 

I think I saw maybe three plays in the entire season where Winston threw the ball away. There's no good reason for this not to have been the fourth.

On this play vs. a fire zone, Winston throws the post.

That wouldn't be a terrible decision except that his running back is uncovered in the flat.

Winston's greatest weakness right now is that he's too aggressive and tries to do too much, and his greatest strength is everything else. He is a very exciting prospect who could start on some NFL rosters right now. Once he learns to take what the defense gives him instead of trying to turn everything into a big play, he'll be a monster.

Rolled Tide: Auburn's Success in the Run Game

Auburn finished the Iron Bowl with 296 rushing yards, averaging 5.7 yards per rush. The last time a team had that many yards on the ground against Saban's defense, the U.S. still had troops in Iraq and Whitney Houston was alive. (I don't know if this will help Florida fans cope, but that team was Georgia Southern.) I wanted to find out how Auburn did it.

Confusion

Auburn's offense is not complicated. I think I counted six different run plays in the Iron Bowl, and the vast majority were inside zone read with various tags added on (such as bubble screens). What makes Auburn's attack so difficult to defend is (1) the tempo and (2) the untraditional formations and frequent motions. When a defense is tired and having to adjust to motion, it's easy for a player to blow an assignment. Alabama is one of the more disciplined teams in the country, but even they were not immune.

On this play, one the the H-backs motions across the formation. After a moment, Alabama linebacker C.J. Mosley runs up to the line and appears to be trying to get the defensive line to shift. He's out of position at the snap. Meanwhile, #20 Jarrick Williams, who plays the "star" position in Saban's defense (basically a nickelback), doesn't move over to mirror the shift until it's too late. He is easily sealed inside by the same player who went in motion, which enables Auburn quarterback Nick Marshall to get around the edge. This would be a frequent problem for the Tide, but I'll get to that.

That example was rather harmless, especially since the play was called back for holding. The next example went 45 yards for Auburn's first touchdown.

The Tigers motion a receiver across the formation in a jet sweep look but run inside zone read with the back, a play they would run frequently. I don't know exactly what the responsibilities were here, but I do know that two Bama players — #42 Adrian Hubbard and #26 Landon Collins — both responded to the jet motion. That's a problem.

With Hubbard chasing the motion man upfield and Collins running up to cut the motion man off, there's a huge lane for Marshall. During the broadcast, Gary Danielson also pointed out Mosley (#32), the linebacker in the middle who shuffles himself out of the play. This defensive front wasn't the one Alabama used most of the day, and this is the only time Auburn ran this play against this front, so I'm not sure how it should have played out. However, I suspect Collins was responsible for the sweeper (that's how most teams do it). In that case, Hubbard needed to respond to the left tackle's down block by shuffling inside, which would have constricted the gap that Marshall ran through. This would have forced Marshall to cut inside where Mosley could make the play*.

* I should say where Mosley could make the play were it not for the fact that defensive end Jeoffrey Pagan got driven five yards back. This was another common theme I'll get to later.

Contain

Alabama's sophomore cornerback Cyrus Jones had a rough night. Auburn ran at him a lot, and Marshall threw the game-tying touchdown pass over his head off one of those inside zone read plays that had the X receiver running a sort of casual fade as a third option. (I was surprised to see that the Tigers actually ran this play a couple of times earlier in the game. It wasn't some gadget they unveiled at the last moment.)

Most notably, Jones struggled with his responsibilities as a run force player; it was frequently his job to "set the edge" on outside runs to his side in order to force the ballcarrier back inside to pursuing defenders. Here is senior corner Deion Belue (#13) showing what setting the edge is supposed to look like (attack the block, keep your outside arm free and stay on your feet):

I don't want to be too harsh on Jones, so I'll only add one gif.

Jones is the cornerback on top, wearing the #5 jersey. He is late attacking the block and doesn't keep leverage to the outside. I counted three more plays in which Jones failed to set the edge; those four plays resulted in 56 rushing yards for the Tigers. To be fair, Jones was not the only player who had trouble on the outside — Williams (mentioned earlier when he was slow to respond to motion) lost contain at least once, and most of the defensive backs missed at least one tackle on the outside at some point. 

The Trenches

Finally, it would be a disservice to paint Auburn's offense as "finesse." The Tigers' offensive line, particularly sophomore left tackle Greg Robinson (#73) and redshirt freshman left guard Alex Kozan (#63), were often dominant.

Alabama's Pagan, who was mentioned earlier, had an especially tough time early in the game. (He got better as the game progressed.) Notice where the line of scrimmage is in the image above.

A few seconds into the play, Robinson and Kozan have driven Pagan nearly three yards back and into the pursuit path of Mosley. 

Here's another example. 

After the snap, Robinson and Kozan have walked Pagan another three yards off the line and into a linebacker. Combo blocks are very difficult for any player, but ideally Pagan would fight the blockers to a stalemate or, if he can't, drop to the ground, taking them down with him and creating a pile. This not only creates an obstruction for the ballcarrier, but it also prevents the combo blockers from reaching the second defender they're trying to get to, usually a linebacker.

I want to be fair to Pagan, so here's a picture of freshman A'Shawn Robinson also being dominated by the combo block of Robinson and Kozan. (He was actually pancaked a split second after this.)

Late in the game, Alabama began using more 3-4 fronts, stunts and corner blitzes. The defensive line play improved, and they even threw in some trap coverages to try to bait Marshall into throwing an interception. These efforts were relatively successful; Auburn was held to 64 rushing yards on 15 attempts in the fourth quarter and 4.67 yards per play. But it was too little too late.

In Defense of Baylor's Defense

I rewatched the Oklahoma State-Baylor game expecting to see Baylor get "exposed." I don't think that's what happened, though there were personnel issues. Instead, I think the biggest factor that enabled OSU to average 8.1 yards per play (2.5 yards more than any other team and nearly three times the season average) was preparation. 

Injuries

You can't properly evaluate the Bears' defensive performance without acknowledging the loss of starting middle linebacker Bryce Hager, who left last week's game against Texas Tech with a groin injury. Because of the injury, Baylor had to move their regular nickelback, Sam Holl, to inside linebacker; safety Ahmad Dixon was moved to nickel; and a redshirt freshman came in at safety. Holl is a good player but he really struggled in his run fits.

Holl is the linebacker on the bottom here, and he goes over the top of the center's block instead of staying in the playside A gap where he needed to be. 

Same mistake here — Holl is the linebacker standing on the hash marks. Notice where the ballcarrier goes after Holl commits. Had he stayed in his gap, the back would have been forced to run into the other linebacker's pursuit.

Linebackers have to be especially aggressive when taking on blocks near the goal line. Compare the play of Holl (circled) to that of linebacker Eddie Lackey, who is standing to Holl's right.

Whereas Lackey is attacking, Holl takes on the block a foot into the end zone. Still, it's hard to blame Holl too much because inside linebacker isn't his regular position.

Another player who had his hands full was senior corner Demetri Goodson.

Watch Goodson's feet. That belongs in a clinic video on how not to play press coverage. He doesn't stay square, doesn't get a good punch and immediately "opens the gate" (takes a step back and turns his hips, which enables the receiver to run by him). He was burned one or two more times but none was as bad as this. In fairness, OSU's #87, Tracy Moore (6-2, 215), is a very underrated player, in my opinion.

I should also note that OSU fullback Kye Staley went into the Baylor game with two career carries — one in 2011 and another a week ago against Texas. Against Baylor, he carried the ball seven times for two scores. I'm not sure what OSU saw that told them to get the ball to Staley — I would guess they saw some advantage in his size (236 lbs.). 

Manipulating the Defense with Motion

I also saw two ways that OK State attacked Baylor's D with various types of motion.

On this touchdown pass in the second quarter, OSU came out in a trips set to the left but motioned the No. 2 receiver across the formation. Baylor checks to man coverage on the bottom and uses a Quarters-type coverage on top. The nickelback jams the inside receiver and takes him man to man. The corner and safety are basically bracketing the routes — the corner will take anything outside and the safety will take anything inside. The problem is in the way No. 1 runs his route: He starts it like a shallow cross but then drifts downfield. This complicates the safety's read. Most teams have their safeties pass off shallow crossing routes to the linebackers in this coverage (they're blitzing here and a defensive tackle drops into the inside underneath zone). The safety is slow to recognize that No. 1 is actually running his route deep and can't get over in time. (Thanks to Reddit user grizzfan for helping break down this play.)

Here's a slightly different look that OSU also found success with. From a 2x2, one-back set, they put a slot receiver in jet motion. Needing to be able to account for the jet sweep, Baylor responded by rushing the nickel off the edge (on the side that the receiver was motioning toward; you can see him walk toward the line when the motion starts) to match the motioning slot while checking to Man Free coverage (man coverage with a single deep safety). With the nickel committed to the motion man, OSU now had the other slot receiver matched up on a safety.

This particular play didn't work, but you can see that the deep safety (#28) wasn't in great position (the receiver shouldn't be behind him) and really broke the pass up more by accident than skill.

On this play — same formation and motion — OSU's slot receiver on the bottom crack blocked the nickel (who, again, is rushing to counter the jet motion). The safety to the play side does a good job forcing the ballcarrier inside, but the running back is able to get in front and cut the pursuing linebacker.

Going into this game, I thought OSU quarterback Clint Chelf was the second-best quarterback in the Big 12 behind Baylor's Bryce Petty. He made a convincing case that he should be #1. But I was surprised at how good OSU's receivers were all night. With TCU and Texas left on its schedule, Baylor won't face another combination of great quarterback and wide receiver play until its bowl game at the earliest. I expect Baylor's defense to rebound, particularly once Hager is back in the lineup.

Mortal After All: How Oklahoma State Stopped Baylor's Offense

There are two major defensive philosophies when it comes to playing Baylor. One is the bend-but-don't-break approach that was employed by Kansas State earlier this year. K-State was content to play two deep safeties with lots of Quarters and Palms coverage and rarely — if ever — blitzed. 

The Wildcats wanted to frustrate the up-tempo Bears' offense, forcing it to sustain slow and methodical drives. This was coupled with a strong run game — KSU average 5.6 yards per rush, a yard and a half more than any other team has averaged on the ground against Baylor. Baylor trailed 25-21 going into the fourth quarter and was held to 7.6 yards per play, its second-lowest average going into Saturday's game.

The second approach is to attack. Oklahoma showed a lot of two-deep shells but brought a safety into the box just before the snap, played a lot of Cover 3 and Man Free and blitzed frequently — even bringing some slow-developing safety blitzes.

Against OU, Baylor was kept out of the end zone until midway through the second quarter, quarterback Bryce Petty looked flustered early and the offense was held to only 5.7 yards per play — a figure that was bested only by Oklahoma State (5.6).

I expected — and based on the way the game went, I think Baylor expected — OK State, a Quarters-based defense, to employ the KSU strategy. Instead, OSU came after Baylor's offense from start to finish. OSU didn't blitz all that much, and they frequently dropped a lineman when they did. 

However, as you can see, they played a good deal of press coverage or simply tight man coverage with their corners. This took away the quick throws to the outside receivers. Then they used the alignment of linebackers to take away the quick inside-breaking routes to slot receivers. What was left for Baylor was contested throws into tight windows or low-percentage throws downfield, and OSU's secondary was excellent in coverage all night.

Baylor also killed themselves with mistakes. Their third-string running back, redshirt freshman Shock Linwood, lost two fumbles — one at the goal line and another at midfield. Petty was off target most of the night and never looked comfortable.

The above play might have gone for a touchdown, but the receiver had to go low to make the catch and lost his footing.

They also suffered from blown blocking assignments in critical moments. On their first drive of the second half, down 21-3, the Bears went for it on 4th & 4. They ran lead option to the boundary. It wasn't a bad call — the Cowboys came out in Cover 1 and Baylor had leverage to the outside.

The problem was in the execution. Two players, the right tackle and the H-back, had opportunities to seal the Will linebacker, Ryan Simmons, and both failed. He was able to stretch out the play and give the deep safety and Mike linebacker time to get over in pursuit.

There were other opportunities for Baylor that they just missed. Leading 14-0 late in the first half, OSU left a slot receiver to the field side nearly uncovered on 3rd & 10. 

Petty didn't notice; he looked to the boundary side, where two defenders dropped into coverage from the blitz front, and was sacked. I don't want to give OSU defensive coordinator Glenn Spencer too much credit, but his defense frequently seemed to know where Baylor was going to be looking to throw the ball, and Petty looked lost when his first read wasn't open.

In addition, OSU played most of the game with its 4-3 personnel, even when Baylor came out in four-wide or empty sets. Simmons and Shaun Lewis are good, athletic linebackers, but they shouldn't be able to cover wide receivers in the open field. 

Against trips, OSU has its corner lock up on the No. 1 receiver then plays a pattern-matching scheme with its Sam linebacker (Lewis), its Mike linebacker and the strong safety. You can see the cushion that Lewis gives the No. 2 receiver against these sets. There's no reason Baylor couldn't have No. 1 run a go route to clear out the corner and then throw a quick-out to No. 2, who would have at least a few yards of space to make a move on Lewis. The play above is another example of how Baylor could have attacked OSU. This is just a variation of Bullets (skinny post/wheel), with No. 1 running a skinny post and No. 2 running a wheel-stop. For whatever reason, Baylor rarely used trips sets and preferred to use quick-hitting, one-read pick concepts that weren't working instead of frequently targeting OSU's backers in space.

Ultimately, Baylor's offense wasn't prepared for what OSU threw at them and was unable to make the proper adjustments. In light of Petty's struggles, OSU quarterback Clint Chelf's ability to go through a progression really stood out. However, it wouldn't be accurate to say Spencer's unit created the template for stopping Briles' offense. For one, KSU showed that there is another way. Moreover, you have to keep in mind that Baylor was missing their two best running backs, one of their best receivers and a tackle. Finally, you can't consider OSU's strategy as a template without noting that it was OSU's tremendous play in the secondary that made the whole thing tick.